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Editorial Introdution by the Guest Editor
Water supply and sanitation are essential for socioeconomic and 
environmental sustainability.  e adequate provision of these services 
is full of complexities and involves a great many challenges. Growing 
population and economic activities, plus soaring energy generation, 
environmental concerns, and climate change will exert great pressures 
on water security. It is not surprising that water has climbed to the top 
of the political agenda. e requirement of appropriate public policies 
to deal with these challenges is self-evident. Sound water regulation is 
a major component of this design. 
e unfolding of water regulation, however, reveals a wide and 
complex kaleidoscope of affairs, which involve different actors, 
dimensions and spatial scales. Surface and groundwater provides 
another set of challenges in discussing water regulation. More 
particularly, transboundary waters – within and between countries – 
impose, in addition to technical challenges, the need for diplomatic 
skills in the handling of their issue and the proposal of solutions. 
is issue of Network Industries Quarterly (NIQ) is linked to the 
Public Policy and Water Regulation International Forum, which was 
organized by Tecnologico de Monterrey, the Water Center for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Cervecería Cuauhtémoc Moctezuma 
– Heineken México in May 2017.  e Forum had an academic 
framework plus perspectives from practitioners working in the field 
of water regulation in Latin America.  Other selected contributors 
were invited to complete this issue with its focus on the Americas. e 
papers on Canada and Texas are a reflection of this inclusion.
e following are the themes included in this issue of NIQ:
• Science, policy and management of groundwater in Canada
• Groundwater regulation in Texas
• Regulation of water and sanitation services in Latin America 
• Incorporation of natural infrastructure in water management 
in Latin America
• e water guarantee fee in Mexico
Guest editor: Dr Ismael Aguilar – Barajas  (Professor, Department 
of Economics and Research Associate at the  Water Center for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Tecnologico de Monterrey, Mexico).
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e guest editor of this special issue is Dr. Ismael Aguilar - 
Barajas (B.Sc.: Universidad Michoacana, Morelia, Mexico; M. 
Sc. and Ph. D.: e London School of Economics and Political 
Science).  Dr. Aguilar - Barajas is a member of Mexico´s National 
Water Council. He was the principal editor of Water and Cites for 
Latin America. Challenges for Sustainable Development, published 
by Earthscan / Routledge in 2015.  His most recent published 
work appears in the Journal of Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 
Water International, and Water Policy.
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Science, policy and management of groundwater in Canada 
Alfonso Rivera*
Canada is a very large confederation composed of 13 different jurisdictions; each jurisdiction manages water resources separately. ere is no 
Canadian water policy; rather, there are water laws and water regulations for each jurisdiction and, until very recently not every jurisdiction 
had groundwater regulations. A common vision for groundwater resources assessment and management is slowly emerging. 
Introduction
Canadians are blessed with a plenitude of freshwater re-
sources, with the generous presence of lakes, rivers and 
aquifers. Yet the abundance mentality that used to prevail 
in the past decades has changed to a mentality of protec-
tion, preservation and sustainability. A recent national 
survey indicated that water is the number one issue for 
Canadians (Ipsos Reid, 2009). Water is widely recognised 
as a resource not only in the service of Canadians but also 
in support of a very vast number of ecosystems (such as 
wetlands). In addition to domestic use and nature’s use, 
Canadians use water for economic development in a large 
number of industries and for agriculture. In fact, the use of 
water resources in Canada is much larger in the economic 
sector than in the domestic sector. Mining, energy and ag-
riculture are the three main sectors using both surface and 
groundwater.
Canada’s total freshwater withdrawals (surface water and 
groundwater) by all sectors is roughly 45 km3 per year, 
which is small compared to the total yearly “renewable” 
freshwater in Canada (3,281 km3) (Rivera, 2014). Nev-
ertheless, we should be careful when considering these 
numbers because of geography, population distribution, 
and other factors. Most of the runoff from Canadian rivers 
(60%) drains north and is “lost” into oceans, while most of 
our population (85%) lives along the southern border with 
the United States. Furthermore, Canada does not have the 
installed dam’s capacity, with its present infrastructure, to 
capture runoff. at is one of the reasons why the use of 
groundwater for domestic purposes has increased so much 
over the past three decades—from 10% in the late 1960s 
to 30% in the 2000s (Fig. 1). 
Most water withdrawals come from surface water with ca 
44 km3 per year, while total groundwater use in Canada 
is ca 1 km3 per year (Rivera, 2014), mostly withdrawn 
for domestic and agricultural purposes. Nearly 30% of 
the Canadian population uses groundwater for domestic 
drinking water, and trends indicate that future groundwa-
ter use will continue to increase at a rate faster than that of 
surface water use (Fig. 1). Possible explanations for such an 
increase are (a) abundant freshwater at shallow depths, (b) 
generally good water quality in aquifers, and (c)  the fact 
that acquisition facilities for groundwater are faster and 
cheaper to build and maintain. 
e single largest disadvantage about groundwater, as 
compared to surface water, is that there is not enough in-
formation at regional scale. e knowledge gaps at region-
al and national scales are groundwater recharge and dis-
charge, its interactions with surface water and ecosystems, 
its volume in storage, vulnerability, and sustainable yields. 
However, at the local level (well scale), where groundwater 
is critical for economic development, the resource is stud-
ied in more detail and is better understood.
e yearly use of 45 km3 of water by Canadians does not 
come without issues. Water quality, climate variability, cli-
mate change, point source and distributed contamination, 
water-use conflicts, and transboundary issues are amongst 
the problems Canadians need to take into consideration, 
on a yearly basis. us, it seems that the main concern of 
Canadians is not water quantity but water quality, sustain-
ability and vulnerability. A trend is slowly emerging where-
by alliances involving scientists, civil society and policy 
makers are considering a common vision for groundwa-
ter resources assessment and management and protection 
against pollution. is article describes science, policy and 
management aspects and issues of groundwater in Canada. 
We discuss how we are enhancing sustainable groundwater 
resources management in Canada in an integrated manner 
(all jurisdictions) with cooperation, knowledge generation, 
shared management and governance.
Application of Water Sciences in Canada
Groundwater is defined as water below the water table, 
which moves in response to gravity and hydrostatic pres-
sure. It results from precipitation and surface water that 
seep into the ground, filling voids and fractures in rocks 
* Alfonso Rivera, Chief Hydrogeologist, Geological Survey of Canada, Natural Resources Canada alfonso.rivera@canada.ca
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to form aquifers. Ground and surface water are inextri-
cably interconnected since the amount and availability 
of groundwater influence surface water availability via 
groundwater discharge into rivers, lakes, wetlands, and res-
ervoirs. For many Canadian rivers, groundwater plays an 
important role in sustaining base flow in rivers. Ground-
water is generally measured at local (individual wells) or 
aquifer scales (hundreds of km2). In Canada, the principal 
source of data originates from most provincial government 
agencies consisting of water well records, hydrogeological 
maps, groundwater levels, information on groundwater 
extraction, and geophysical logs (CCME, 2010). Although 
provincial wells represent direct data for the estimation 
of aquifer recharge, they are localized and typically short 
(around 30 years with none longer than 50 years) (Rivard 
et al., 2009). ey are not always located near climate and/
or streamflow stations, making comparisons with surface 
conditions difficult; they can also be affected by ground-
water pumping (Rivera et al., 2004). Recently, however, 
aquifer-mapping remote sensing - based has become sig-
nificant and shows great potential (Rivera et al., 2015). 
In Canada, groundwater recharge rates typically are not 
more than 7% of annual precipitation, but are difficult 
to quantify.  Normally, the measuring of precipitation is 
required followed by the performance of a water balance 
through the estimation of all the other surface water flux-
es (runoff, evaporation, transpiration). ere are regional 
differences clearly marked in groundwater recharge across 
the Canadian landmass. Groundwater recharge in eastern 
Canada varies between 1000 and 1500 mm/yr.; the Prairies 
region between 50 and 400 mm/yr; western Canada aver-
ages 500 to 2000 mm/yr.; and there is not enough infor-
mation for northern Canada (Allen et al., 2014). Ground-
water discharge occurs through direct discharge to surface 
water bodies, flow through formations, or pumping from 
a well. In semi-arid regions such as the Canadian Prairies, 
direct evaporation and/or evapotranspiration from the 
shallow water table is the primary discharge mechanism. 
Discharge is also difficult to quantify, especially in areas 
dominated by well pumping or evaporation. 
Figure 1. Canada’s groundwater resources (A); and groundwater use (B). 
Source: Canadian Geographic,  adapted from Rivera (2014)
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Resource assessment, modeling, monitoring and mapping
Federal government and most of the provincial govern-
ments use a wide set of tools to assess groundwater re-
sources: hydrogeology, geomatics, geology, geophysics, 
geochemistry, groundwater modeling, isotope fingerprint-
ing, aquifer mapping, and groundwater data management 
and dissemination.  Currently the department of Natural 
Resources Canada is the lead for aquifer mapping and 
groundwater quantity and assessment strongly relaying in 
geology, geophysics and geomatics as its main tools.
Modeling of the Canadian water cycle, water resources 
and disasters (drought and flood) are among the most ad-
vanced studies at regional to national scales using remote 
sensing (Wang et al., 2013; Huang et al. 2012). Multi-sat-
ellite, interdisciplinary approaches to assessing water bal-
ance closures, groundwater storage changes and environ-
mental change impacts (including climate change) are part 
of the current scientific endeavors of federal government, 
together with the strong cooperation of universities and 
provinces.
Furthermore, great efforts are being developed to gener-
ate national and international hydrographic networks and 
standardized data on aquifer and groundwater, which are 
easily accessible through the Internet using a Groundwater 
Information System (GIN, 2017). New activities are un-
derway to include groundwater data on transboundary aq-
uifers located along the Canada-US international border.
Policy and Management Water Issues in Canada
Being such a large Federation represents a challenge for 
Canada: close to 10 million km2 of landmass, 10 Prov-
inces, 3 Territories, 3 Oceans, and ashared water manage-
ment mandate. Water resources management is shared by 
13 jurisdictions, divided in four levels of government. At 
the Federal level, there are at least 20 federal departments 
involved in water management. e top five departments 
leading some aspects of water resources are: Environment 
and Climate Change Canada (surface and groundwater 
quantity and groundwater quality), Natural Resources 
Canada (groundwater quantity), Agriculture and Agrifood 
Canada (surface and groundwater quantity and quality), 
Health Canada (surface and groundwater quality), and 
Fisheries and Oceans (Water regulations for federal lands).
Provinces have the principal lead on water management 
and protection within their boundaries, though they have 
delegated certain water activities to municipalities or local 
agencies. As a result of multiple players and responsibili-
ties, data and knowledge are dispersed across jurisdictions 
and entities. is makes management and access to data 
for decision-making one of the most important challenges.
e importance of water -environmentally and strategi-
cally- justifies a federal presence. e Government of Can-
ada has broad powers over environmental issues. It also has 
authority when it comes to “peace, order and good govern-
ment”, when there is an issue of “national concern” (Côté, 
2006). Shared federal-provincial responsibilities include 
water issues relating to agriculture, health, and the envi-
ronment. Various regional and national workshops, as well 
as reports from expert panels, have recognized that gaps in 
groundwater knowledge might hinder good groundwater 
management and governance (CCA, 2009). 
Social participation
Participation of society on government-related decisions 
has always been a Canadian trait. It has been recognized 
that the best management practices on groundwater gov-
ernance require the review of socioeconomic and cultur-
al issues. For instance, current activities led by CCME 
(2010) incorporate shared rights and obligations with 
a common vision for sustainable use of groundwater, in 
promoting science in the decision-making process. Frame-
works of public governance supported by regulations are 
slowly emerging to build trust and increase cooperation. 
For example, the Quebec PACES program (Programme 
d’Acquisition de Connaissances sur les Eaux Souterraines 
(MDDELCC, 2009) addresses groundwater sustainabili-
ty and provides useful context for the implementation of 
the CCME’s Groundwater Sustainability Assessment Ap-
proach (GSAA). e Quebec PACES program is creating 
local groups with specific mandates and technical and ad-
ministrative support.
Conclusions
e aim of this article was to describe science, policy and 
management issues of groundwater in Canada. ere was 
also the intention to show how the country is enhancing 
sustainable groundwater resources management in an 
integrated manner. Canada is a very large confederation 
composed of thirteen different jurisdictions where each 
jurisdiction manages water resources separately. Gaps in 
groundwater knowledge are recognized by all governments. 
ere is no single institution in Canada dedicated to all 
aspects of groundwater; nonetheless, the last decade has 
seen an emerging trend where institutions and organiza-
tions have been including groundwater in their plans more 
explicitly (research, management and governance). Strong 
science-based regulations are the preferred choice of most 
provinces for water management and governance. Public 
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consultation, collaboration, shared management and gov-
ernance are Canadian traits of applying a code of values 
and ethics in all aspects related with governance. Despite 
the scale and diversity of the country, and its highly decen-
tralized government, Canada seems to be coming together 
as a country with the same (almost) water resources vision, 
management and governance. e future for acquiring 
data and knowledge on the aquifers and groundwater re-
sources of Canada looks promising.
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Groundwater Regulation in Texas
Mary E. Hilderbrand*
Texas groundwater regulation aims to conserve the resource to ensure sufficient future supply.  Local Groundwater Conservation Districts, 
with authority to issue permits and limit production, vary in how and how much they regulate groundwater withdrawals.  Piecemeal, local 
regulation and a property-rights approach limit the effectiveness of efforts to manage groundwater. 
Introduction
Groundwater is a critical source of water for Texas; it 
accounts for about 60% of the water used in the state. 
While there are nine major and 21 minor aquifers, 90% 
of the supply comes from only three: the Ogallala, Car-
rizo-Wilcox, and Gulf Coast aquifers.  More than 75% 
of existing supply goes to agriculture, mostly for irriga-
tion. By contrast, municipal use, as well as manufactur-
ing and mining, depends primarily on surface water, with 
groundwater providing only 27% of water for these uses 
state-wide (TWDB 2016: 65-71; Lesikar 2011: 3).  Nev-
ertheless, aquifers supply water to numerous municipali-
ties, including San Antonio, and there are about 22,000 
wells for public water supply in Texas (TWDB website). 
ere are serious concerns about future availability of 
sufficient water.  Demand for water is projected to rise 
17% by 2070, due to population growth, while total 
water supply is falling.  Groundwater supply is project-
ed to decline 24% over the next fifty years. In a historic 
shift, around the middle of the 21st century, municipal 
demand for water will begin to exceed that of agriculture 
(TWDB 2016: 53). Furthermore, Texas has experienced 
droughts periodically throughout its history, and recent 
droughts have been particularly severe and widespread. 
Climate projections are for less rainfall, creating uncer-
tainty and putting additional pressure on groundwater.
As a common pool resource, groundwater is subject to 
overuse in the absence of collective management or regu-
lation to ensure that the resource is preserved.  is has, in 
fact, been the case in Texas, where the mining of aquifers 
has led to problems with subsidence in some places and 
compromised quality in others.  us, the question of 
its regulation is pertinent.   is brief article will discuss 
first the underlying law and policy context, highlighting 
the tension between its two guiding principles.  It will 
describe existing regulations and the local-state relation-
ship.  en it will discuss several issues that arise around 
regulation of groundwater, including its limitations, its 
piecemeal approach, and emerging markets for water.  It 
argues that Texas’ approach to groundwater rights, to-
gether with a reliance on local regulation, compromise 
the state’s efforts to manage and conserve groundwater.  
Law and policy context
In Texas, two conflicting principles underlie policy and 
regulation over groundwater.  First, under what is known 
as the “rule of capture”, landowners have the right to 
withdraw all the water that they can from under their 
land.  ere are few limitations—only that the pumping 
must not be done with malicious intent, be intentional-
ly wasteful, cause subsidence of neighboring land, or in-
volve drilling sideways under a neighbor’s property.   e 
principle, derived from English common law, was adopt-
ed by the Texas Supreme Court in 1904.  While other 
western US states have abandoned it, Texas has continued 
to use it and state courts have upheld the rule.  In essence, 
it gives landowners property rights over the water they 
withdraw. (See Opiela 2002 and Torres 2012.)
Notably, this approach differs from that for surface water, 
which is held in trust by the state and for which the right 
of prior appropriation applies (TWDB 2016:121-22). It 
also differs from the treatment of oil and gas, for which 
a “correlative rights” approach is used, with landowners 
having property rights to the resources beneath in pro-
portion to the amount of land owned (Opiela 2002: 114).
e second principle behind Texas water law is conser-
vation, articulated in an amendment to Article 16 of the 
Texas State Constitution, passed in 1917: “e conser-
vation and development of all the natural resources of 
this state… and the preservation and conservation of all 
such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby 
declared public rights and duties; and the legislature shall 
pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto (Texas 
Constitution).”  
Building on that 1917 “conservation amendment”, 
*  Mary E. Hilderbrand, Director, US-Mexico Transboundary Water Governance Project, Institute for Science Technology and Public Policy, Bush School 
of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. mhilderbrand@tamu.edu
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in 1949 the state legislature authorized the creation of 
groundwater conservation districts (GCDs), thereby es-
tablishing the initial framework for regulation of ground-
water. at framework has gradually been strengthened, 
most significantly in 1997 and 2005.  While GCDs were 
created only slowly at first, in 1997 the legislature got se-
rious about them: Senate Bill 1, which lays out the water 
code, designated GCDs as the “preferred mechanism” for 
regulating groundwater. en, in 2005, the legislature in-
creased the GCDs’ role in water planning, requiring them 
to define “desired future conditions” within their areas. 
For the first time, the 2017 State Water Plan was created 
from the bottom up, based on the GCD-defined desired 
future conditions, as well as locally defined water man-
agement strategies to reach those conditions. us, the 
GCDs have become increasingly significant in planning, 
management, and regulation of groundwater (TWDB 
2016: 122; TWDB website).
e private property basis of groundwater rights—stem-
ming from the courts—and the conservation principle 
in the Texas constitution, with its corollary policy and 
regulatory framework—developed by the state legisla-
ture—coexist uneasily.  But both have to be taken into 
account.  GCDs increasingly regulate groundwater and 
have the authority of the legislature to do so, despite 
resentment and even resistance from some landowners. 
Conflicts between the two principles end up in the courts 
for resolution.  Despite various interpretations of, and 
qualifications to, rule of capture, it is that principle that 
has consistently been upheld in the face of challenges to 
regulation, and the legislature has declined so far to take 
action to change it. 
Local-level regulation
It is the state that has created the framework for ground-
water regulation and state law that gives the GCDs the 
authority to regulate.  e state water code lays out what 
aspects of groundwater production can be regulated and 
establishes parameters for doing so.  But the legislature 
has devolved regulation itself at the local level.  e 
GCDs are local governmental units with considerable 
latitude in terms of what, how, and to what extent they 
regulate groundwater within their districts.  
As of 2017, there are 100 GCDs in Texas.  ese include 
all or part of at least 174 counties, but many of them are 
single-county districts (TWDB, 2016: 120). us, Texas 
is a patchwork quilt of mostly small GCDs.  Some areas 
still do not have GCDs; for the most part, they are unreg-
ulated and the rule of capture applies without limitation. 
ere are several districts that are set apart due to par-
ticular characteristics, problems, or history.  e Har-
ris-Galveston Subsidence District was created in 1975 in 
response to significant subsidence and thus increased risk 
of flooding along the Gulf Coast.  e nearby Fort Bend 
Subsidence District was established in 1989 due to a risk 
of subsidence there.  Both function as GCDs but with 
the particular purpose of reducing withdrawals from the 
Gulf Coast aquifer in order to prevent further subsidence. 
e Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) regulates ground-
water over the Balcones Fault Zone of the Edwards aqui-
fer.  Its creation in 1993 was to preempt a threat by the 
federal government to take over management of the aq-
uifer in order to protect several endangered species.  e 
EAA has the goals of preserving the aquifer, preventing 
its pollution, and managing spring flows so as to protect 
endangered species that depend on them (EAA website). 
Although it was created separately, it functions as a GCD 
but with more restrictive regulation than most.
Whereas in early years GCDs were created voluntarily by 
landowners at the local level, most are now established 
by legislative action.  In some instances, the state pushes 
areas into forming GCDs.  is is especially the case with 
areas that have been identified as experiencing, or at risk 
of experiencing, problems with water quantity or quality, 
or subsidence. ese areas are labeled Priority Ground-
water Management Areas (PGMAs).  If local stakeholders 
within these priority areas do not form a GCD within 
two years, TCEQ is required by the water code to come 
in and form one. Nevertheless, there are still some are-
as within the eight designated PGMAs that do not have 
groundwater districts (TCEQ website).
e purpose of regulation is to conserve and manage 
groundwater in order to ensure that adequate water is 
available under drought conditions and that the “desired 
future conditions”, as determined by each GCD and in-
cluded in the state water plan, are attained.  To that end, 
GCDs have the authority to require and issue well per-
mits, impose production limits, regulate well spacing, and 
regulate export from the district.  Significantly, though, 
there are two major categories of wells that the state wa-
ter code exempts from regulation by GCDs.  First, wells 
for domestic use, or for livestock or poultry use, on land 
larger than 10 acres and with wells that cannot produce 
more than 25,000 gallons per day, are exempt. Second, 
water wells drilled for the use of rigs engaged in oil or 
gas exploration or production, including fracking, are 
not regulated unless they are drilling through or affect-
ing aquifers that supply fresh water. In addition, a GCD 
may exempt other wells, as long as it has established clear 
criteria for doing so. (TX Water Code 36.117. See also 
Lesikar 2011: 18-20.)
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GCDs must have a program for issuing permits for drill-
ing, and they can regulate well spacing in order to prevent 
reduction in the water table.  ey may limit production 
of regulated wells in several different ways, such as by set-
ting production limits on wells, limiting pumping based 
on acreage, or setting an overall cap on production.   Per-
mits are also issued for exporting groundwater out of the 
district (TX Water Code, 36.113 and 36:116.  See also 
Russell, 2014: 2-4; Lesikar, 2011:18-20). 
In practice, there is considerable variation across GCDs, 
perhaps most significantly in terms of production limits. 
Approaches range from establishing an annual withdraw-
al cap, such as one acre-foot (or more) per acre per year, 
basing production on reasonable use, to not limiting pro-
duction at all (Russell, 2014: 3-4).  e Edwards Aquifer 
Authority regulates production based on a combination 
of historical beneficial use and an annual overall with-
drawal cap tied to water availability.  at approach has 
been challenged for its potential, under historical usage, 
for preventing landowners who had not previously with-
drawn groundwater from drilling a well at all and thus 
benefitting from the groundwater under their property 
(Torres, 2012: 6-9).
Issues and challenges
Although the extent of regulation has grown over time, 
it remains quite limited. GCDs are in place throughout 
much of the state, but there are substantial areas without 
them and thus with essentially no regulation or efforts to 
limit overproduction.  Furthermore, even within GCDs, 
many wells are exempted.  Water used in the oil and 
gas sector—a major economic activity in Texas—is not 
regulated; state wide that does not amount to a signifi-
cant proportion of water used, and much of what is used 
is brackish, but it can be significant in particular areas 
(RCT website). GCDs vary in the extent to which they 
attempt to manage or limit production; many do not re-
quire the use of meters or reporting of water use by own-
ers of permitted wells (Hardberger, 2016: 18).   In the 
case of the Edwards Aquifer Authority, which has some of 
the strongest regulations in place, court challenges have 
called its limits into question (Torres 2012:9). 
With the state divided into more than one hundred most-
ly small, mostly squarish pieces, GCDs do not correspond 
to aquifer boundaries.  Multiple GCDs have jurisdiction 
over their own bits of the same aquifer, each imposing 
its own rules that may be quite different from those of 
the GCD next door.  e state recognizes this problem, 
and has provided a mechanism for coordination, espe-
cially with regard to planning:  Texas is divided into six-
teen Groundwater Management Areas (GMAs), which 
more closely approximate the boundaries of aquifers. e 
GCDs within each GMA work together to develop the 
desired future conditions for the area and are expected 
to coordinate their management.  Despite these efforts, 
regulation of groundwater is fundamentally fragmented 
and piecemeal.
An emerging challenge concerns the development of 
markets for water.  With growing municipal demand 
and either physical or regulatory limits on how much 
groundwater can be withdrawn, municipal authorities 
and private water companies are looking for sources out-
side their own areas.  In unregulated areas outside GCDs, 
municipal authorities can buy a small plot of land, drill a 
well, and pump as much as the well can support. With-
in GCDs, however, permitting and production restric-
tions foreclose that option, and buying water from other 
sources becomes attractive.  An analysis of the market in 
groundwater in Texas found that currently such agree-
ments are made individually and privately, and there is 
not a clearinghouse of information about potential sup-
pliers and buyers to allow for a statewide market to de-
velop, or for prices to reflect market value (Hardberger 
2016:15-21). An additional barrier to developing such a 
market is the lack of infrastructure for conveying water 
from one area of the state to another.   Yet the existing 
regulatory framework makes that difficult to overcome—
GCDs’ understandable preference for granting short-
term withdrawal permits and reluctance to make long-
term commitments, given their need to adjust to aquifers’ 
changing conditions, are at odds with investors’ need for 
long-term contracts and financing in order to commit to 
large infrastructure projects (Russell, 2014: 4).
ere remains, ultimately, the contradiction between the 
rule of capture and private ownership of groundwater, on 
one hand, and the conservation imperative of the Texas 
Constitution, on the other.  e importance of conserva-
tion is magnified by drought, expectations of reduced wa-
ter supply, and population growth that means greater de-
mand and a shift from agricultural to urban predominant 
use. Despite that, the rule of capture and the preference 
for local regulation together result in weak regulation and 
continued overuse of Texas’ groundwater resources.
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Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services in Latin America
Óscar Pintos*
is article presents an overview of regulation of water and sanitation services in Latin America and the Caribbean. Particular attention is 
placed on the evolution of the regulatory frameworks, as well as on key requirements for good regulation. e role of ADERASA is presented 
at the end.
Introduction
As in any economic activity regarded as a natural mo-
nopoly, water and sanitation (W&S services must have 
specific regulation. is regulatory framework needs to 
recognize the essential nature of these services for popu-
lation well-being, with social and economic sustainability 
criteria. is article presents, in four parts, the Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean (LAC) experience in this regard. e 
first part addresses the evolution of the W&S in the region, 
using a comparative perspective that links the infrastruc-
ture of these services with their institutions and regulatory 
representative models. e second section deals with the 
indispensable requirements for an effective regulation. e 
third part touches upon the measurement of efficiency 
in water utility entities. Finally, this contribution centers 
upon the role of the Association of Regulatory Entities of 
Water and Sanitation of the Americas (ADERASA), in the 
institutional strengthening of regulation in this region. 
Evolution of physical and institutional infrastructure 
Systems of water and sanitation develop along three stag-
es. e first relates to water quantity, in which the focus is 
on increasing coverages of water and sanitation through 
major infrastructure works. is phase has been complet-
ed in developed countries (DC) and is still pending in 
LAC. In this stage, institutional infrastructure responds to 
a traditional model characterized by the involvement of 
(mostly) State operators in the planning, formulation and 
policy implementation of water regulation.  In this model 
the State has an active role; users have a passive function 
and are without major rights before the water operator.
 e second stage refers to water quality. In addition to 
physical infrastructure, there is an emphasis on the im-
provement of the quality of services (water quality, con-
tinuity, and physical pressure, for instance). ere appears 
the concern with managerial efficiency, regardless of the 
nature of the operator (State or private).  e tasks of pol-
icy definition and planning, and those of operation and 
regulation are carried out by different organisms. is cre-
ates a new model in which water users acquire rights and 
play a central role in the provision of services. Regulatory 
entities are technical, highly specialized organisms of the 
State but with autonomy from the Government. ese 
new bodies must care for the sustainability of the W&S 
services (through fair and reasonable rates).  Another ma-
jor function is to make sure water users´ rights are respect-
ed by operators of an essential service, which also happen 
to enjoy a natural monopoly and have more power – tech-
nically and economically – than users. is stage has been 
concluded in most DC and is relatively consolidated in 
some countries of LAC.
e third phase is a deeper version of the second and 
centers on the management of both demand and the en-
vironment.  In this stage, quality of services has a more 
prominent role through different actions: control of losses, 
management of sources, treatment and reuse of residual 
waters.  is is a more holistic approach to guarantee pub-
lic health and general well-being. ere are also efforts to 
improve the environmental sustainability of water services. 
ere is also a greater professionalization of the water sec-
tor.  Tariffs are closer to the costs of provision. is stage is 
in course in more developed nations while in LAC coun-
tries the impact of water services on the environment is a 
major concern.  
Overall, developed nations show a more sequential and 
coherent evolution. In LAC countries there has been a gap 
in the development of these two infrastructures.  e com-
mitments and challenges associated with the 2030 Devel-
opment Agenda, particularly with Objective No. 6, imply 
that large investments will be required.  e latter involve 
not only physical infrastructure (networks, plants) but also 
institutional strengthening of all actors.
Table 1 contains the construction of the water institu-
tional framework for selected LAC countries.  e latter 
were grouped according to two criteria: 1) territorial ex-
*  Óscar Pintos, President, Association of Regulatory Entities of Water and Sanitation of the Americas (ADERASA). opintos@aferas.org.ar
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tension, and 2) political organization (unitary or federal). 
e second criterion relates to the characteristic of the reg-
ulatory authority. e table shows that among the largest 
countries, Mexico is the only one that does not have a reg-
ulatory entity. On the other hand, the access to water is not 
only in the national regulatory frameworks; in 2010 the 
General Assembly of the United Nations passed resolution 
64/292 that granted this access the character of right.
is transcendental resolution has characteristics which 
make this right different from other rights. It is a reaction 
against the mercantilist vision of water provision.  It is not 
the result, like other rights, to stop the advancement of the 
State over the individuals.  It is rather a recognition that 
water is not a transactional good in the market and that, 
as a result, needs special regulation.  is resolution is also 
a reaction  to the authoritarian vision of State provision 
of water, by changing the passive role that these models 
give to users. A point worth clarifying is that the human 
right to water does not mean the service is provided free 
of charge. What it means is that no human being should 
be denied access to water in the light of economic insuffi-
ciency. Instead, the responsibility of removing this obstacle 
is allocated to the State, not to the operator (public or pri-
vate). e solution should come from subsidies (direct or 
indirect) and from any other remedy that the legal frame-
work allows in each case.  By being part of the State, regu-
latory organisms also have the obligation of promoting the 
fulfillment of this right.  
Requirements of a good regulation
e good and effective work of a good regulator is as-
sociated with indispensable requirements, legal and insti-
tutional. For instance, the performance of a regulator is 
a function of clearly defined policies and roles.  On the 
other hand, the regulatory entity must meet the following 
conditions:
• Independence from the government of the day
• Stability of management (mandates for pre-deter-
mined periods) 
• Economic and managerial autonomy
• Transparency
• Previsibility
• Proportionality
• No discrimination
In Latin American and the Caribbean, the emergence of 
regulatory entities was the result of the policies for water 
and sanitation of the 1990s. Within the fashion of the 
Washington Consensus, countries of the region granted 
concessions for water and sanitation to private companies. 
Driven by macroeconomic decisions, and not by the matu-
rity of national and subnational water systems, there were 
separated functions that used to be at the hands of national 
or subnational governments. Although these governments 
retained the authority for these systems, they handed the 
Country Creaation of national company Descentralization Introduction of 
regulation
National legislation
Unitary countries of small geographical extesion
Costa Rica 1942 Limited 1996 1942
Cuba 1962 2001 No hay 2001
Ecuador 1965 1992 2001 2014
El Salvador 1961 Limited None Pending
Guatemala None Limited None Pending
Haití 1977 2010 None 2009
Honduras 1961 1991 2003 2003
Nicaragua 1998 Limited 1992 2007
Panamá 1961 Limited 1996 2001
Paraguay 1966 2000 2000 2000
R. Dominicana 1962 1973 None Pending
Uruguay 1952 None 1996 1952
Unitary countries with large geogrpahical extension
Bolivia None None 1997 2007
Chile 1977 1998-2001 1989 1988
Colombia None 1974 1992 1994
Perú 1981 1994 1992 1993
Federal countries
Argentina 1912 1981 1992 Pending
Brasil None 1988 2007 2007
México None 1983 None Pending
Venezuela None 2001 None 2001
Table 1: Chronology of the Institutional Construction of Water and Sanitation Services in Latin 
America and the Caribbean
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operation to these companies and the regulatory functions 
to technical agencies created for this purpose.
Although the results of privatization were not the expect-
ed ones, and often states ended up recovering the operation 
of these services – through agreements or judiciary pro-
cesses – this movement increased, substantially, the quality 
of institutional performance. It brought about changes in 
the entrepreneurial culture of operators that remained, in-
cluding the new state operators. ere was also progress in 
the consideration of users as a collective with rights, and in 
the capitalization of the experience of regulatory agencies. 
e re-involvement of water services provision by the 
State led to questioning whether there was still a role for 
regulatory agencies, created to oversee the performance of 
private companies. An objective and non-ideological per-
spective, plus more than two decades of experience, con-
firm the need to maintain and strengthen these agencies, 
regarding their attributions, human and material resources. 
Some of the most prominent reasons are the following:
• Independent of the operator (public or private), 
every natural monopoly tends to inefficiency.
• e state character of the water company does not 
guarantee the public or general interest.
• e solution to complaints from users cannot reside 
in the willingness of the state operator; in the ab-
sence, or insufficiency, of a proper response, there are 
administrative mechanisms prior to embarking on 
judicial avenues. 
• It is difficult that the State (owner of the operator) 
impose self-control and self-sanction measures in the 
light of complaints from a weaker third party (water 
user).
en, even if the operator is an entity of the State, there 
must be a specialized organism (regulator) that:
• enjoys autonomy from the executive power;
• protects the rights of water users from the monopo-
listic power of the operator;
• audits, externally, the state operator, in accordance 
with the existing regulatory framework and informs 
the executive and legislative branches;
• promotes citizen participation and control (public 
audiences, right to information).
Measurement of efficiency in state water and sanita-
tion companies
 Water and sanitation utilities are natural monopolies; 
therefore, efficiency depends more on their institutional 
design (type of judiciary status, regulatory framework) 
than on the nature of their functioning (private or public). 
It is obvious that private firms tend to gain commercial 
efficiency and economic benefits.  Regulation plays a key 
role concerning rates and quality of service. On the oth-
er hand, public operators may include non-commercial 
objectives (social benefits and equity) above objectives of 
economic efficiency.
is does not mean that efficiency and equity necessarily 
confront each other.  At the end of the day, inefficiency 
conspires against social objectives (equity). erefore, in a 
modern, State-led firm, the achievement of both efficien-
cy and equity are worth pursuing.  is is why knowing 
and applying good practices (between operators and regu-
lators) is a good idea.  Sharing information and strength-
ening institutional capacities of all actors are fine examples 
of this interchange of experiences.  e role of ADERASA 
regarding these necessities is worth discussing.
The role of ADERASA in the institutional fostering of 
regulation in Latin America and the Caribbean
ADERASA, founded in 2001, is composed of 19 coun-
tries (Map 1). is organism organizes its work through 
Regional Working Groups. e following are the themes 
addressed by these groups: benchmarking, drinking water 
quality, green regulation, small operators, public operators, 
and regulatory accounting. Regulatory entities collaborate 
with the groups of their interest.  ere is an annual meet-
ing and teleconferences.  e working documents of these 
groups are discussed and approved in an Assembly. e 
group of benchmarking publishes an annual report, which 
has become a reference for the international community.
 One of the primary functions of ADERASA has been to 
promote and consolidate debate and information sharing 
among the water regulators of LAC countries. Undoubted-
ly, this is of high value in the light of the great challenges 
the region is and will face, especially in connection to the 
access and affordability of water and sanitation services. 
Not only in quantitative terms but also in quality. 
ADERASA
Participating	countries
Not		associated	countries
Associated	countries
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Needs and opportunities to incorporate natural infrastructure in 
water management in Latin America
Hugo Contreras*
Latin America is a water - rich region; however, water security is being challenged. is is due to increased stress and the effects of climate 
change. Natural infrastructure can help mitigate some of these water risks in a cost-effective manner. Yet, regulatory and policy frameworks 
are not generating adequate incentives to do so. 
Introduction
Most future scenarios indicate that water risks in Lat-
in America will increase over the coming years. On the 
one hand, demand for water is growing due to increas-
ing population, economic activity and energy generation. 
On the other, climate change is affecting the patterns of 
rain. ese climate changes show acute events, more often, 
both in terms of droughts and floods. In spite of the need 
to increase investments in traditional build infrastructure 
solutions such as dams, aqueducts and treatment plants 
to face these challenges, their magnitude and the size of 
the investments needed are beyond the current financial 
capacity of the Region. Bringing nature back as part of 
the solution may prove to be a cost-effective addition to 
complement traditional approaches. However, regulatory 
and institutional frameworks need to be adapted to allow 
for an effective inclusion of nature based solutions. is ar-
ticle will describe the challenges and opportunities present 
in the regulatory frameworks of various Latin American 
countries, to benefit fully from these alternative solutions 
as complements to traditional grey infrastructure.
Background
Latin America accounts for more than thirty percent of 
the available freshwater in the world, while it houses less 
than ten percent of the population. Globally, the average 
per capita availability is among the highest in the world. 
Despite the relative abundance, water is not adequately 
distributed. e Amazon basin accounts for more than fif-
ty percent of the water reserve, while population living in 
water stressed areas will more than double in the coming 
years. Additionally, Latin America hosts some of the most 
exposed regions to climate change in the world. For ex-
ample, since 2000 Central America has endured climate 
related disasters with an approximate cost of 39 billion 
USD, equivalent to 19% of the sub region´s GDP (e 
International Disaster Database, 2017).
e majority of the Latin American countries have shown 
significant improvements in the access to water and sanita-
tion services over the last few years. To do these improve-
ments, the annual investment has averaged between 0.1% 
and 0.4% of GDP (Anderson, 2007). e Development 
Bank of Latin America (CAF) estimated that over the pe-
riod 2010-2030, US$80 billion will be spent on sewerage 
infrastructure, and US$30 billion on waste water treat-
ment (Rodriguez, 2017). Furthermore, in a context of rap-
id urbanization – in 2014 around 80% of population was 
urban and in 2050 it will be 86% (United Nations, 2014) 
–‘, there is also a growing demand for energy and food. 
is demand will increase with the occurrence of climate 
related events. erefore, optimizing investments in wa-
ter and sanitation will be a necessary condition to preserve 
and increase standards of living.  Maintaining sources of 
water in this context also plays a fundamental role. 
Whereas there is a case for continuous investments in tra-
ditional grey solutions for water and sanitation - such as 
dams, aqueducts and treatment plants -, there is mount-
ing evidence of the benefits that natural infrastructure can 
provide in a cost-effective manner. Natural infrastructure 
is defined as a “strategically planned and managed network 
of natural lands, such as forests and wetlands, working 
landscapes, and other open spaces that conserve or en-
hance ecosystem values and function and provide associ-
ated benefits to human populations” (Benedict, and Mc-
Mahon, 2006).  In a recent study published by e Nature 
Conservancy (TNC) it is estimated that 1 in every 4 cities 
out of a sample of 2,000 around the globe could bene-
fit from natural infrastructure solutions and the Return 
on Investment would be positive. If we add some other 
benefits such as climate change adaptation and health, the 
economic case could be made to even 1 in every 2 cities 
(Abell., et al. 2017).
*  Contreras, Director, Latin America´s regional unit for water security,  e Nature Conservancy. Email: hacontreras@tnc.org
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The case for regulation
e most cited case for the use of natural infrastructure 
is New York and the Catskills. Since the intake was be-
ing threatened by non-point pollution, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) mandated the City to safeguard 
the quality of water. e estimated investment to the City 
was in the order of 8 billion USD. In an unprecedented 
decision, the City´s authorities opted to target the non-
point sources of pollution, thus reducing the influx of 
sediments to the intake. Among the activities performed 
were land acquisition, to eliminate productive activities, 
and changing agricultural management practices. e City 
has so far invested nearly 1.5 billion USD in this program, 
and has been able to avoid further regulation by the EPA. 
Complementary to this paradigmatic example, the World 
Resources Institute (WRI) has made a compilation of eco-
nomic cases from various cities and water security chal-
lenges in the US. (Gartner, et al. 2013)
e regulatory threat by EPA induced a non-traditional 
response by the City, which allowed for significant savings. 
Given the current regulatory framework in most countries 
in Latin America utilities are not responsible to protect 
their sources of water; when they are, they do not have the 
mandate to invest in natural infrastructure solutions, even 
when economic gains would be achievable. Furthermore, 
regulation of watershed management is scattered among 
various authorities, effectively discouraging water utilities 
to including source water protection as part of their port-
folio of solutions. 
TNC is currently developing a study to better understand 
where the responsibility for source water protection lies, as 
well as the sources of financing for such a responsibility. 
Some preliminary findings are presented below. Table 1 
contains a comparative framework about the type of gov-
ernment, responsibility over source water protection, and 
challenges to incorporate natural infrastructure in water 
management.
Argentina
Water management as well as finance and protection of 
water sources are the responsibility of the Secretariat of 
Public Works, through the Undersecretary for Water Re-
sources. To facilitate coordination between the national 
and provincial level, there is the Federal Water Council 
(Consejo Hídrico Federal). In addition to this structure, 
the current Government has included inventorying and 
protecting sources as one of the axes of water policy by up-
scaling the monitoring network of the country, and adapt-
ing to climate change (Presidencia de la Nación Argentina, 
2016).
Like in other countries reviewed, there is little clarity re-
garding the alignment of roles with respect to water pro-
tection policies. Besides the Undersecretary for Water Re-
sources, the National Environmental Committee and the 
National Park Administration have policy and financing 
roles in this regard. As for the provinces, the regulatory 
framework grants them a high degree of autonomy to 
manage water resources, which represent a significant por-
tion of the total available sources. Utilities and provincial 
regulators have not included natural infrastructure as part 
of their strategies.
Brazil
e Federal Constitution (1988) divides water resources 
management responsibility between the Federal govern-
ment and states. In 1997 National Water Resources Policy 
and National System for Water Resources Management 
were established in the Water Law, - Law 9433 (Congres-
so Nacional do Brasil, 1997). e System defines the co-
ordination framework for different stakeholders to work 
together under the Watershed Committees, where they de-
fine policies, plans, actions and funding mechanisms at the 
watershed level.  e National Water Agency (ANA) was 
established in 2000 to implement water policy.
Regardless of a relatively well-defined framework, perhaps 
the most significant challenge is alignment. Federal, state 
and even local authorities often have different if not con-
flicting interests, which makes implementation complex. 
In addition to this complexity, lack of sufficient financial 
resources have also been an issue. Just a few Watershed 
Committees raise sufficient funds to have impact on the 
water resources. Given these complexities, water utilities 
may find it costly, and with low probability of success, to 
consider including green infrastructure projects in their 
solution portfolios. 
 
Figure 1: High Andean paramo provides the city of Quito, 
a regular flow of quality water
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Chile 
Over the last few years the country has shown rapid pro-
gress towards universal provision of water and sanitation 
services.  In 2017 a bill was submitted to Congress to re-
form the National Water Code which was originally pub-
lished in 1981 (Contraloría General de la República, 1981) 
to incorporate some elements that would allow for better 
management and protection of water resources. Among 
others, the bill seeks to amend the concept of water rights, 
to: limit its exercise; make them temporary; limit the ex-
ercise of some water rights on scarcity situations; establish 
caducity hypothesis for water rights; facilitate intervention 
of hydrological areas by the State; and reform the non-use 
fee payment system.
Even though the country shows high levels of technical 
capacities to deliver water services, efforts to protect sourc-
es of water and including these initiatives into mainstream 
public policy are not apparent. e approach so far has 
been to advance based on voluntary agreements on specific 
watersheds, such as in the Maipo river, where nearly 20 
actors from government, private sector and NGO commu-
nities have gathered around the preservation of perhaps the 
most economically important source of water in the coun-
try. Private companies have invested their compensation 
funds in natural infrastructure, but in most cases without 
the participation of the utility to maximize impact.
Colombia
e decree 2811 of 1974 established the National Code 
of Renewable Natural Resources and Environmental Pro-
tection (Ministerio de Agricultura, 1974). Since then it 
has built a sophisticated legal and regulatory framework 
to safeguard water and its sources. Notwithstanding these 
long traditions, implementation remains a challenge, 
which has undermined the effectiveness of the system.  In 
1993, 33 regional environmental authorities were estab-
lished, with financial and administrative autonomy, re-
sponsible for managing natural resources, including water. 
Although these authorities are responsible for executing 
policy and implementing projects, they have lacked the 
financial resources to do so. In this regard, coordination 
and alignment with local water utilities has been a chal-
lenge, hence limiting their impact. In addition to that, few 
utilities have incorporated natural infrastructure in their 
strategies.
Mexico
Environmental and natural resource protection resides 
within the Ministry of Environment, as in the case of most 
other countries in the region. e National Water Com-
mission, in turn, is a de-concentrated institution of this 
Ministry. e country implemented a watershed approach 
to managing its water resources, much like the Brazilian 
model. Watershed committees have a design to enable the 
participation of stakeholders as consultative bodies for pol-
icy design and to set priority actions. In theory, resources 
to finance such committees would come from water rights 
paid for by users. However, there is no clear appropria-
tion rule for these resources to the committees.  Lack of 
financial resources has resulted in the weakening of tech-
nical capacities of the committees. is has thus limited 
their ability to plan and execute projects at the watershed 
level, leaving these responsibilities to authorities such as 
the National Forestry Commission or state agencies. Water 
utilities rarely ever act on the protection of their sources, 
beyond being part of watershed committees. 
Conclusions and recommendations
ere is mounting evidence that natural infrastructure 
provides significant hydrological ecosystem services such 
as maintaining and improving quality, regulating flows 
Country
Responsibility over 
source water protec-
tion
Challenges to incorporate natural infrastructure in water 
management
Argentina Federation, States and municipalities
Alignment and coordination, financial resources, inclusion of 
natural infrastructure in regulators and utilities´ strategies.
Brazil Federation, States and municipalities
Alignment and coordination, inclusion of natural infrastruc-
ture in regulators and utilities´ strategies
Chile National government Incorporating natural infrastructure into water policy
Colombia National government Alignment and coordination between levels of government and with utilities acting on the watersheds
Mexico Federation, States and municipalities
Alignment and coordination, inclusion of natural infrastruc-
ture in utilities´ mandate
Table 1: Protection of Water Sources and Natural Infrastructure Management in Selected Latin American Countries
Source: Own elaboration.
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and facilitating infiltration. When seen from an econom-
ic perspective, utilities could reduce their operational and 
capital expenditures, thus improving their financial condi-
tion by including ecosystems into their strategies. When 
considering other co-benefits such as biodiversity as well 
as resiliency, TNC estimates that one in every two cities 
around the world would show a positive return on invest-
ment (ROI) were they to include these types of solutions 
to their current portfolio of water management projects 
and policies. Yet, in Latin America protecting the sources 
of water still faces major challenges. e most recurrent 
relate to horizontal and vertical alignment among various 
levels of government and ministries. Also relevant is the 
fact that the majority of utilities and cities have not in-
corporated natural infrastructure into their strategies and 
investment portfolios.
ere are some good examples of initiatives to adopt an 
integrated water management approach in the various 
countries. In Brazil, the Water Producer program has been 
gaining popularity among municipalities and utilities. 
In Argentina, source water protection has been elevated 
as one of the four strategic axes for the Government.  In 
Colombia, utilities and local authorities have utilized the 
Water Fund model to this end (Alianza Latinoamericana 
de Fondos de Agua, 2017). In Chile, voluntary agreements 
are occurring. In Mexico, some watershed committees are 
turning to the protection of their natural infrastructure, 
and some cities are also adopting the water fund model.
ese are some examples of how to accelerate the adop-
tion of natural infrastructure:
• Increase impact by mapping the various initiatives 
that governments have around environmental and 
natural resources management and align them with 
water management objectives. 
• Incorporate natural infrastructure as an element in 
the earlier stages of project planning to ensure com-
plementarity with traditional grey solutions and 
maximize social, economic and environmental re-
turns on public investments.
• Create regulatory and institutional environments 
that facilitate the adoption of natural infrastructure 
by all relevant actors in water management, in par-
ticular regulators, utilities and large water users. 
• Develop evidence via business and policy cases to so-
cialize the benefits of natural infrastructure and to 
address finance and economic ministries to incorpo-
rate them into the discussion, as well as to inform 
legislators and other relevant decision makers.
• Include source water protection into the water finan-
cial system, which includes tariffs, taxes and rights, 
in order to reveal the cost of nature, incentivize its 
protection and generate financial resources to invest 
in source water protection.
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The water guarantee fee in Mexico
Luis Joaquín Chávez*
is contribution focuses on the water guarantee fee in Mexico. is instrument has been designed to aid the sustainability of water use. In 
practice, however, it has been functioning as a fiscal collection mechanism. It is concluded that this initiative is not an adequate means to 
reach the end. Legal complexities are pointed out.
Introduction
Today more than ever water becomes essential to the vi-
ability of civilization in general. Much has been written 
about its scarcity and its growing demand by the popu-
lation. Mexico is not exempt from these challenges and 
today according to the National Water Law (“LAN”) is a 
national security matter. e over-exploitation of ground-
water reserves is among the factors that caused this situ-
ation (16% of reserves are currently over-exploited). [1] 
In this context, the Mexican State has recently shown a 
higher degree of regulatory activity regarding water issues. 
In 2004, with a broad reform to the LAN, the incremental 
process of the creation of legal norms started albeit unfin-
ished and with clear room for improvement) in order to 
promote the moderate use of water resources.
In this reform an unknown concept within the legal con-
cepts called “Guarantee Fee” was introduced, which could 
not be understood until the “Rules for the Determination 
and Payment of the Non-Expiration of National Waters 
Rights Guarantee Fee” (the “Rules”) were published in 
2011. e rational of this “Guarantee Fee” is to pay an 
amount of money in order to avoid the loss of water vol-
ume not used by the licensees. e adoption of this new 
concept within the legal framework, far from providing 
clarity to the individuals, has produced insecurity and un-
rest in the governed, mainly because it is perceived as a 
mechanism for tax collection purposes, even though it was 
implemented as a public policy response for the sustaina-
ble use of water in the country. 
Understanding the Guarantee Fee 
A general rule in the Mexican legal water system is that 
the authorized volume of water must be used in its entire-
ty; otherwise, the administrative authority, that is the Na-
tional Water Commission (CONAGUA), has the power 
to extinguish and recover the water that has not been used 
by the title-owner in a period of the past two consecutive 
years. However, the LAN allows the title-owner to keep 
unused volumes of water, among other considerations, if 
he pays the guarantee fee.
e Rules establish how the guarantee fee is calculated 
which is the product of the multiplication of two factors:
1. Of the “authorized fee by m3” set by the Mexican 
Tax Authority, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Pú-
blico; and
2. Of the “unexploited, or unused minimum volume of 
water for a period of two consecutive years” which is 
the minimum volume obtained by comparing two 
differences: (i) that which results from the total vol-
ume of annual licensed water minus the volume of 
water used during the first 12 months of the obser-
vation period of two years; or (ii) that which results 
from the total volume of annual licensed water mi-
nus the volume of water used during the second 12 
months of the observation period of two years. 
For better clarity, the “unexploited, or unused minimum 
volume of water for a period of two consecutive years” 
can be shown with an example of a water title-holder of 
100m3 per year, which has not been used in its entirety. 
Table 1 shows Case 1. ere is an exploited volume of 90 
m3 in the first 12 months and of 80 m3 in the second 
period of 12 months. us, the minimum volume is 10 
m3 and it is located in the first 12 months of the period. 
Case 2 is also shown. ere is a total annual concession 
volume of 100 m3 and an exploited volume of 70 m3 in 
the first 12 months and 95 m3 in the second period of 12 
months. e minimum volume is 5 m3 and it is located in 
*  Luis Joaquín Chávez, Legal Manager, Cervecería Cuauhtémoc Moctezuma Heineken – México. Email: luisj.chavez@cuamoc.com
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the second period of 12 months of the observation period.
 Some notes for a better understanding of the guarantee 
fee and its determination are:
1. e minimum volume starts in the period in which 
there is a greater exploitation of water. erefore, 
in Case 1, the minimum volume is the one corre-
sponding to the first 12 months, since that is when 
the most volume of water was used from the entire-
ty of the concession; similarly, in Case 2 the mini-
mum volume corresponds to the second period of 
12 months.
2. e result obtained by subtracting the volume used 
from the total volume of licensed water, is the vol-
ume of water not used during the observation period 
of 2 years. 
us, by multiplying the “unexploited, or unused mini-
mum water volume for a period of two consecutive years” 
by the “authorized fee by m3”, the guarantee fee is ob-
tained.
The guarantee fee is more expensive than the ordinary 
extraction of water, and therefore does not generate ef-
ficient use incentives.
Since its first publication in 2011, the amount of the 
guarantee fee has been higher than that corresponding to 
the fees of extraction of waters, whether these are under-
ground or surface waters. e rationale used by CONA-
GUA in order to justify the higher cost of the guarantee 
fee in relation to the cost of the fee of the water extraction 
is based on the fact that it represents the cost of social op-
portunity that means “keeping a certain volume of water 
inactive”. In this regard, the CNA establishes that the so-
cial opportunity cost is estimated based on the economic 
resources that were ceased to be generated by economic 
activity and the income that the State failed to receive. 
e opportunity cost, understood as the value of the 
most valuable good or service which is rejected   is, first of 
all, a concept of economic nature that has been developed 
broadly by the specialized literature in that area, with broad 
content and applications in ordinary life. is concept il-
lustrates the cost associated with decision making, when a 
good or service is chosen and another is abandoned, which 
has helped to understand the behavior of consumers when 
deciding on the acquisition of goods and services from a 
microeconomic aspect.
In this sense, CONAGUA assumes that the licensed vol-
ume that is not being used by an individual has an op-
portunity cost insofar as another potential licensee cannot 
take advantage of it, given the scarcity of vital liquid. is 
presumption of the administrative authority is partially 
valid but incorrectly applied in the legal field. It is partially 
valid because the national demand for water has increased 
behaviors and there is the over-exploitation of some under-
ground waters, which further accentuates water shortage. 
However, it is not correct to consider that if a licensee (or 
even a hypothetical and future licensee) can do so. is is 
because the water volumes are not permanent and their 
availability is calculated on the basis of studies and proce-
dures of hydrological nature, which are not necessarily ac-
curate. is means that the administrative authority grants 
the concessions based on an approximation of the availa-
bility of water, without having a certain accuracy over their 
actual quantity. Even the LAN recognizes this situation.
From the LAN perspective it is clear that CONAGUA, 
even when granting a concession to an individual, does not 
guarantee the existence or invariability of water . In oth-
er words, these are virtual volumes of licensed water, over 
which there is no absolute certainty of their existence, un-
less the individual performs the corresponding exploration 
and drilling work. Due to this situation, it is considered 
that the application of the economic concept of  “opportu-
nity cost” has been inadequately extrapolated to the legal 
field. is is because, according to the economic literature, 
the opportunity cost implies the cost of choosing an alter-
native, when another option is really available. at is, the 
opportunity cost implies that there are two alternatives, 
real and available, at the time when the decisions are made. 
is situation, of course, does not occur in this case, since 
the licensee is not sure that (i) it exploits all the licensed 
volume at a specific time, or whether it may continue to 
do so in its entirety in the future; or (ii) if it exploits a part 
of the licensed volume, it may have the rest of the available 
volume in the future.
In other words, it is not really an opportunity cost sce-
nario, since there is no certainty that the non-chosen alter-
Case 1
Minimum
 Volume
Vol. = 100 m3 – 90 m3
Vol. = 10 m3
Vol. = 100 m3 – 80 m3
Vol. = 20 m3
Case 2
Minimum
 Volume
Vol. = 100 m3 – 70 m3
Vol. = 30 m3
Vol. = 100 m3 – 95 m3
Vol. = 5 m3
Period (time)
First 12 months Second 12 months
Observation Period of 2 Years
 
Table 1: Illustrative example of how the minimum volume is calculated for a period of two years.
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native (volumes of water not used by the licensee) is truly 
an option available to the individual. at is, there are no 
mechanisms to guarantee that if the CNA extinguishes 
the rest of the volume not used by a licensee, it may be 
available to another user interested in obtaining a conces-
sion. is is due to the difficulty implicit in the calculation 
and updating of water availability (at least in the case of 
groundwater).
Based on the above, the CNA justifies why the guarantee 
fee must be higher than the fee of water extraction. e 
main reason provided by the authority is the opportuni-
ty cost, an unfortunate application for the case study, as 
noted above. is produces incentives contrary to those 
contemplated by the regulation. e above is because for a 
private person that does not use all the volume of licensed 
water and wants to avoid the expiration of those volumes, 
it could be more attractive to pay the cost of water extrac-
tion than the guarantee fee. us, even within the period 
of two years, anyone could avoid the expiration of unused 
volumes or the payment of the guarantee fee, through the 
indiscriminate and wasteful use of volumes of licensed wa-
ter. is is radically opposed to the intention to encourage 
the efficient use of water.
Judicial criteria
During August of 2016 the Second Chamber of the 
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice  published mandatory 
criteria regarding the guarantee fee, as a result of several 
lawsuits filed against that measure. Despite the comments 
above mentioned regarding the incentive of water waste, 
the Court considered that the guarantee fee: 
1. Is not contrary to the human right of access to wa-
ter and, therefore, does not encourage waste, but ef-
ficient use, since it does not allow the liquid to be 
misused.
2. It is not a fine, because its payment is voluntary.
3. It promotes the rational and efficient use of water 
because (i) it allows the authority to grant unused or 
exploited volumes of water to other interested per-
sons; and, (ii) it implies an economic outlay to main-
tain those unused volumes that may have meant the 
generation of “benefits and payments rights (contri-
bution)”. 
4. It promotes the reflection of the user so that, after 
paying the guarantee fee, he uses those volumes in 
the future.
5. It is a measure to preserve the national hydrological 
balance and favor the protection of water resources
It is believed that the Court’s resolutions are unfortunate 
as they support a mechanism that, far from providing clar-
ity to the Mexican legal system, favors its deficiency, since 
it causes legal uncertainty to individuals and discourages 
the efficient use of water. Unfortunately the court’s criteria 
are not surprising, considering the last years in which it has 
adopted “pro-government” decisions when they are linked 
to economic aspects. e foregoing, often aligned with the 
budgetary pressures in which the public sector is involved 
and the rationale of the Ministers become more inclined 
to adopt political decisions and, subsequently, raise them 
with a legal veil.
It is also important to mention that these criteria did not 
address the discussion of water and legal policy. ey only 
solved the legal aspects of common order that are used in 
any other litigation, without having made a real statement 
in those judgments about the management and planning 
of public water policy within the constitutional limits. Al-
though the outcome of the trials is often the cause of the 
arguments of the parties, it would have been desirable to 
have judicial resolutions with a view to solving the water 
problem.
Conclusions
After having analyzed what the guarantee fee is and how 
it has been implemented in Mexico, it is possible to offer 
the following conclusions:
1. It is not an adequate means to reach the end. e guar-
antee fee may promote the indiscriminate and irra-
tional use of water resources, in the understanding 
that it does not promote economic inducements for 
those concessionaires that have been efficient and 
that have not used the water volumes in their en-
tirety.
2. Legal complexity. e understanding of the guarantee 
fee is not affordable for the average user, partly due to 
the technical level of the tax matter applied to water 
issues, but also, to a large extent, due to the deficient 
regulation.
3. Collection purpose. Even when the Federal Public 
Administration intends that the guarantee fee to be 
conceived as a mechanism to promote the proper use 
of water, it is clear that the underlying purpose is tax 
collection. 
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Competition and Regulation in Network Industries: a new Journal by  Sage
Commencing in 2017 SAGE is delighted to be the new publisher of Competition and Regulation in Network 
Industries.
We are building on the 16-year tradition and strength of the existing Intersentia Journal Competition and Regulation 
in Network Industries, yet strive to evolve it into an even higher quality journal, addressing the increasingly urgent 
challenge of governing (including regulating) complex and dynamic socio-technical systems (e.g., energy, transport, 
water, communication, urban systems), especially in light of pervasive digitalization.
Network industries are caught between technological developments, evolving competition and regulation. At the same 
time significant innovations – especially in the field of ICTs – offer new opportunities for infrastructure operations 
and governance. Exploring this combined technological and institutional dynamics between competition and 
regulation provides a fascinating field of research that challenges academics, managers and policy-makers alike.
e new Journal Competition and Regulation in Network Industries is resolutely interdisciplinary in nature, favoring 
articles that combine economic, legal, policy and engineering approaches and seek to link theory with practical 
relevance. It is a double- blind peer-reviewed journal that offers leading specialists opportunities to provide an in-
depth and forward-looking view on the evolving network industries.
Publication process:
e Journal welcomes submissions and engages in a collaborative discussion with the authors so as to produce the 
highest possible quality articles. Each article is double-blind peer reviewed. After acceptance, articles are published 
online on a rolling basis. 4 paper issues are published each year, containing each 4 to 6 articles.
e Journal holds an annual conference at the European University Institute in June each year. Papers presented 
there are offered a fast-track review process.
Editor in chief:
Prof Matthias Finger, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and European University Institute
Submit Now!
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Research for the TRAN Committee - 
Infrastructure funding challenges in the 
sharing economy 
© European Union, 2017 
Finger, Bert, Kupfer, Montero, Wolek, 2017, Research for TRAN 
Committee – Infrastructure funding challenges in the sharing 
economy, European Parliament, Policy Department for Structural 
and Cohesion Policies, Brussels 
89 pages 
About the Study 
The study analyses the disruption created by shared mobility in the funding of transport infrastructure. 
While recognizing the benefits of shared mobility in terms of reduction of private car use, the study 
identifies that there might be short term negative effects on the revenues of long distance railway and 
coach operators. It also points out other potential risks, which include capturing the revenues through 
commissions charged by platforms mediating mass-transit services (Mobility as a Service), freeriding and 
lower tax contributions. The study makes recommendations to reduce these risks.  
  
About the Series 
The Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union is responsible for organising the work of 
European Parliament's committees in the field of internal policies and contributing to the exercise and 
development of the legislative and control powers of the European Parliament. Among its main tasks, DG 
IPOL is providing the committees, other parliamentary bodies and the President's Office with briefings, 
background notes and long-term studies on all aspects of Parliament's activities in the field of internal 
policies. Directorate B is the responsible one for Structural and Cohesion Policies. 
Download the study 
Video highlights 
 
Prof Juan Montero, team member of the research group that 
produced the study, presents the issues and the main results of the 
project.  
 
Watch the video  
 Presentation of the study at the European Parliament  
 
The European Parliament’s Transport and Tourism (TRAN) 
committee invited the project leader, Prof Matthias Finger, to 
present the study. The presentation followed by a discussion with 
Members took place on Monday 4 December 2017. 
 
Watch the video 
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Air Transport Liberalization
A Critical Assessment
Edited by Matthias Finger, Professor, Management of Network
Industries, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale Lausanne, Switzerland and
Kenneth Button, University Professor, Schar School of Policy and
Government, George Mason University, US
This groundbreaking book offers a critical and wide-ranging assessment
of the global air transport liberalization process over the past 40 years.
This compilation of world experts on air transport economics, policy, and
regulation is timely and significant, considering that air transport is
currently facing a series of new challenges due to technological
changes, the emergence of new markets, and increased security
concerns. 
ʻThe 30th anniversary of the start of the liberalization of air transport in Europe, leading to the
creation of the successful EU internal aviation market, is an excellent time to review the
transformation of the aviation industry which has taken place throughout the world over the past
few decades. This book brings together ten studies of how markets have changed in different
countries. But it does more than that. It also reviews broader, generic topics such as safety, small
community services and hub domination and the impact liberalization has had on each of them.
Finally, it looks at future challenges, particularly in air traffic control and security. The wide range of
topics covered helps to put the subject of air transport liberalization into context and reveals the full
extent of the remarkable journey the aviation industry has taken in most people's lifetimes, as well
as how much more there is to do.ʼ
– Barry Humphreys CBE, Aviation Consultant, UK
ʻProfessors Finger and Button have assembled an impressive array of informative, insightful, and
useful chapters that, taken together, offer a compelling endorsement for liberalizing air transport.
Although a scholarly collection, there is much in this volume of direct relevance to aviation
practitioners in both the private sector and governments.ʼ
– John Byerly, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Principal U.S. Aviation Negotiator,
US
ʻAir transport liberalization has led to a substantial increase in the level of economic activities and
traffic growth. This is an excellent book providing a comprehensive view of the topic and covering
airline liberalization in the US, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the
sustainability of competition. This book also explores aviation safety in the age of liberalization,
and the domination of hub-and-spoke networks. The eighteen chapters in the books are written by
and for practitioners and academics.ʼ
–Bijan Vasigh, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, US
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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE (FLORENCE), 21-22 JUNE 2018
7th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
New network structures: decentralization, prosumers and the role of online platforms
CALL FOR PAPERS
Introduction
e de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an on-going process at both the national and global levels. As this 
process unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge, necessitating a constant reassessment of the content and objectives of regulation.
e rapidly evolving Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have significantly challenged the traditionally stable 
landscape of infrastructure services provision. e new data layer over the traditional infrastructure and service layers is transform-
ing network industries: online platforms create new indirect network effects, they allow new service providers to enter the market 
(prosumers, sharing economy providers, etc.), and they challenge the central role of traditional infrastructure managers/service 
providers as entities ensuring the coordination of the sectors.
Offering traditional and new services in an innovative way is a growing trend among public authorities, traditional providers as 
well as new private operators, prosumers and platforms. However, together with great opportunities, disruptive innovations also 
give rise to new regulatory challenges, especially when it comes to infrastructure financing and the coordination of operations.
is 7th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures aims at taking stock of the major challenges infrastructure regu-
lation is currently facing as a result of technology, indirect network effects, newly emerging network structures (decentralized 
networks, distributed networks, sharing economy), and new actors (prosumers, OTTs, platforms, etc).
Papers will be presented in different parallel sessions dedicated to the following infrastructure sectors:
• Communications and media
• Energy and Climate
• Transport and mobility
• Water distribution
• Wastewater and waste management
We encourage contributions that link different infrastructure sectors, especially in light of the ICTs. Contributions utilizing 
multidisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary approaches to regulation are welcome. Papers linking academia and practice, as 
well as policy research papers are particularly encouraged.
e conference is intended for academics such as PhD students, PostDocs and Assistant/associate/full Professors as well as aca-
demically minded practitioners.
Florence School of Regulation – via Boccaccio 121 – 50133 Firenze – Italy 
http://fsr.eui.eu/
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Conference structure
e format of the Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures is unique:
• Each presenter has 45’, which includes 20’ of presentation, 10’ of qualified feedback and 15’ of discussion with the audience 
(there are only 2 papers per session, guaranteeing high quality discussions);
• Feedback will be given by senior professors associated with the Florence School of Regulation who are specifically knowledge-
able about the topic athand;
• Papers that will be retained for publication will receive additional feedback beyond the Conference.
Timeline
• Submission of the abstract by 15 January 2018 (word format download the guidelines) using the online form. For any issue 
regarding the submission, please contact Ms Nadia Bert at fsr.transport@eui.eu;
• Notification of acceptance by 19 February 2018;
• Submission of the full paper by 26 May 2018; participants who fail to submit a full paper by this deadline will be automat-
ically removed from the programme;
• Conference on 21-22 June 2018 in Florence (Italy).
Conference fee
• 150 EUR - Partial fee waivers for PhD students are available. Please contact Ms Nadia Bert at fsr.transport@eui.eu for further 
information.
Guidelines for the abstract
• 600-1000 words
• Title of the paper & keywords
• Name of the author(s) and full address of the corresponding author
• e aim and methodology of thepaper
• Results obtained or expected
Publication opportunities
Papers will qualify for the Journal Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, which is published by Sage as of 2017.
A summary of the 4-5 best papers will have the chance to be published in the dedicated issue of the Network Industries Quarterly 
(Issue 20, Vol 3, September 2018).
Organizing Committee
• Prof Simone Borghesi (EUI, Part-time professor, Energy & Climate Area of the FSR. Siena University, Professor)
• Prof Matthias Finger (EUI, Part-time professor and Director of the Transport Area of the FSR. EPFL, Professor and Director 
of the Chair of Management of Network Industries)
• Prof Jean-Michel Glachant (EUI, Robert Schuman Chair, Director of the FSR, Director of the Energy & Climate Area of 
the FSR, Holder of the Loyola de PalacioChair)
• Prof Pier Luigi Parcu (EUI, Part-time professor, Director of the Communications and Media Area of the FSR, ENTraNCE, 
and CMPF)
• Prof Stéphane Saussier (EUI, Part-time professor and Director of the Water Area of the FSR. IAE de Paris, Professor and 
Director of the EPPP Research Group)
Florence School of Regulation – via Boccaccio 121 – 50133 Firenze – Italy 
http://fsr.eui.eu/
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 20, issue 1 (March 2018) 
“Governing Energy Transitions: strategic challenges of local utility companies in the Swiss 
energy transition”” 
Presentation of the next issue
Currently, many countries are firmly committing to a transition towards a more sustainable energy system, each 
facing their own unique challenges. e Swiss energy transition is particularly challenging due to a combination of 
commitments: (1) a gradual phase-out of nuclear energy, currently about a third of the country’s electricity production, 
is expected by 2034, (2) construction of new renewable energy sources such as solar PV, wind and micro-hydro, (3) 
electrification of heating and transportation, (4) energy saving, and (5) stringent CO2 emission targets. 
Utility companies play an important role in the realization of the Swiss energy transition, but are also facing numerous 
strategic challenges as a consequence of a rapidly changing playing field. e commitments necessary to transition towards 
a more sustainable energy system are not necessarily aligned with the current operations of local utility companies. For 
example, the lack of incentives for energy efficiency programs, market opening, smart grids and renewable energy has 
utilities looking for new business models.
e next issue of Network Industries Quarterly (NIQ) is linked to the Certificate of Advanced Studies (CAS) in Governing 
Energy Transitions, a continuing education program organized by the Chair Management of Network Industries at the 
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL). e program has a strong practical component, embedded in an 
academic framework of multi-level governance. Participants of the program were invited to contribute to this issue, 
sharing their insights on the strategic challenges of local utility companies in the Swiss energy transition. 
e following are some of the themes to be included in the next NIQ:
• An overview of urban utility companies’ strategic responses to the energy transition: comparing Swiss and German 
utilities.
• Implementation of a local demand-side management program in Switzerland.
• An international perspective on demand-side management programs, and policy-recommendations for a Swiss 
governance model.
• A broader identification of new business opportunities for utility companies, arising from the ongoing energy 
transition. 
Guest editor: Reinier Verhoog 
(PhD student, Chair Management of Network Industries, Institute for Technology and Public Policy, College of 
Management of Technology,  École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne).
e guest editor of this special issue is Reinier Verhoog (B. Sc. And M. Sc.: Delft University of Technology, Delft, the 
Netherlands). Reinier Verhoog is currently a PhD student and the program manager of the CAS in Governing Energy 
Transitions at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL). He is also an advisory editor for the Competition 
and Regulation in Network Industries Journal. His most recent published work appears in Environmental Modelling and 
Software and International Journal of Complexity in Applied Science and Technology.
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Implementation of the liberalization process has brought various 
challenges to incumbent firms operating in sectors such as air transport, 
telecommunications, energy, postal services, water and railways, as well as to 
new entrants, to regulators and to the public authorities.
Therefore, the Network Industries Quarterly is aimed at covering research 
findings regarding these challenges, to monitor the emerging trends, as well 
as to analyze the strategic implications of these changes in terms of regulation, 
risks management, governance and innovation in all, but also across, the 
different regulated sectors. 
The Network Industries Quarterly, published by the Chair MIR (Management 
of Network Industry, EPFL) in collaboration with the Transport Area of the 
Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute), is an open 
access journal funded in 1998 and, since then, directed by Prof Matthias Finger.
Open Call For Papers
The Network Industries Quarterly is a multidisciplinary international 
publication. Each issue is coordinated by a guest editor, who chooses four 
to six different articles all related to the topic chosen. Articles must be high-
quality, written in clear, plain language. They should be original papers 
that will contribute to furthering the knowledge base of network industries 
policy matters. Articles can refer to theories and, when appropriate, deduce 
practical applications. Additionally, they can make policy recommendations 
and deduce management implications. 
Detailed guidelines on how to submit the articles and coordinate the issue 
will be provided to the selected guest editor. 
Article Preparation
Published four times a year, the Network Industries Quarterly contains short analytical 
articles about postal, telecommunications, energy, water, transportation and network 
industries in general. It provides original analysis, information and opinions on current 
issues. Articles address a broad readership made of university researchers, policy 
makers, infrastructure operators and businessmen. Opinions are the sole responsibility 
of the author(s). Contact fsr.transport@eui.eu to subscribe. Subscription is free. 
Additional Information
More Information
• network-industries.org
• mir.epfl.ch
• florence-school.eu
Questions / Comments?
Deniz Dalgic, Managing Editor:
dedalgic@yahoo.com
Cyril Wendl, Designer: 
cyril.wendl@epfl.ch
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